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Summary
In this thesis we present the requirements needed for a Condition Based Main-
tenance (CBM) solution by using Wireless Sensor Networks(WSN).
The sensor network needs to be secure and reliable to be implemented in a
CBM solution, hence we have chosen the popular ZigBee protocol to see how it
fulﬁll the reliability requirements of transmission delay, lost packets and battery
consumption. The security requirements is based on the CIA(conﬁdentiality,
integrity, availability) triad for security objectives, and in this thesis we will give
a general overview of the security mechanisms used in ZigBee to achieve these
requirements. Also a brief overview of threats a WSN faces is also presented.
Practical experiments for testing delay, battery consumption and environ-
mental interference from magnetic ﬁelds has been conducted using XBee units
from Digi International. These tests shows that the transmisson delay is within
acceptable levels, and the battery consumption for sensors allows them to run
for several years.
Another contender for use in industrial processes is WirelessHART by HART
Communication foundation. Like ZigBee, WirelessHART is based on the IEEE
802.15.4 standard for wireless personal area networks. However WirelessHART
has a diﬀerent speciﬁcation for the data-link layer than ZigBee and oﬀers funda-
mental diﬀerences like Time Division Multiple Access and Frequency Hopping
Spread Spectrum while ZigBee uses Carrier Sense Multiple Access and Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum.
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1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks is an emerging technology with many uses within in-
dustrial automation. The networks consists of low power and low rate sensor
nodes. makes them suitable for running on a battery for up to several years,
and makes them suitable for many applications such as monitoring. The most
common type of wireless communication technology used for sensing and mon-
itoring is known as Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPAN).
LR-WPAN is characterized by low-cost, low power wireless devices that self-
organize into a short-range wireless network that supports low powered appli-
cations as sensing and monitoring. Networks can be a simple one-hop star
topologies to more complex multi-hop mesh networks.
While Wireless Sensor Networks is more cost eﬀective compared to wired
networks the use of wireless sensors has yet to have a breakthrough in the
industry. The reason for this is the security and reliability challenges in these
networks. In a closed wired network an outsider needs to gain physical access
to the equipment or abuse a compromised machine.
Key concerns within the automation industry has been a lack of suitable
standards to fulﬁll the demand of reliable and secure communications. Two
standards that are used in the industry are ZigBee and WirelessHART. Both
provides a set of protocols, services, and interfaces for vendors to create LR-
WPAN hardware platforms and software applications that will enable companies
to deploy Wireless Sensor networks for monitoring and control processes.
In the industry today most companies exchanges equipments or parts of
an equipment based on a schedule regardless of the condition of the machine.
Because of this parts that are still in working condition will be replaced even
though there is no need for replacement yet. The most eﬀective way is to
replace parts based on their condition and not on a schedule. This solution is
called Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). To make CBM possible there is a
constant need of monitoring and wireless sensors are perfect for these purposes.
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1.1 Research Question
The ﬁrst question we need to answer is what features a Wireless Sensor Network
(WSN) for use in Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) applications need. To
ensure that a WSN is viable as a replacement for wired sensor networks there
have to be a certain level of reliability and security required from the WSN. But
what exactly are these requirements, below we outline some of the features we
need to consider.
• Reliability
 The transmission delay in a wireless sensor network is higher than in
a wired network. This can be due to unforeseen circumstances such as
interferences from external sources, objects blocking the way of the
signal, etc. In an industrial environment is important that crucial
data is received as fast as possible to be more eﬀective. How impor-
tant is this for CBM, which situations require very low transmission
delay?
 The networks needs features that ensure messages is safely delivered
to the destination. Therefore some sort of detection is needed for lost
packets.
• Security
 Resilience against attacks. For example: DDoS, Man in the middle,
Sybil attack. All these attacks may cause maintenance systems to
break down and report a bad state. What kind of security is needed
for CBM applications. Major threats to WSN for CBM applications
needs to be identiﬁed.
 Incorrect data may lead to severe damages to a company. We need to
be able to trust that the data is correct, and not corrupt or have been
tampered with. Take for example in CBM applications a critical part
may not be replaced before breaking down because the data a sensor
has been sending is incorrect or have been tampered with.
The next part of the research is deciding if a WSN actually meets the require-
ments outlined in the ﬁrst part. To be able to decide this we need to get
background information about protocols and standards and design tests and
later implement the tests to see if the WSN meets the requirements for CBM
applications.
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1.2 Importance of Research
Today most industries still use wired sensors for industrial processes, and while
it is eﬀective it also may cost more than a wireless sensor network. This thesis
will take in consideration the security and reliability in wireless sensors networks
as an replacement for wired sensor networks for industrial purposes.
One of the main future uses for these wireless sensor networks is in Condition-
based maintenance (CBM). The wireless sensors will be used to monitor the
equipment condition or status. For example an electric motor may have a vi-
bration sensor, if the vibrations detected by this sensor goes beyond certain
parameters it may have to be exchanged. Instead of letting it run until it
breaks down completely, halting production or be a safety risk. It also may be
cheaper than exchanging a motor on a schedule (Preventive maintenance).
Laying down wires for sensors for monitoring tens or hundreds of parts in
a complex system may be prohibitively expensive or impossible (Independent
moving parts), here is where the wireless sensor networks come into play.
The importance of this thesis is to be able to ﬁnd the most reliable(delay,
robustness, timing etc) wireless sensor standard for an industrial environment.
Based on our research we want to be able to conclude if WSNs are reliable and
secure enough for use in CBM.
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1.3 Assumptions
This thesis will rely on existing literature for many aspects. We have to assume
that published literature, especially on the security aspect, are correct.
We also have to depend on protocol speciﬁcations for evaluating the Zig-
Bee protocol, especially since some features might not be compatible with or
available on the equipment used in this thesis. We will assume that speciﬁca-
tions are correct and come with Errata if there are any issues not in the main
speciﬁcation.
We will also use existing papers and research for our comparison of Wire-
lessHART and ZigBee, as we can only conduct tests on the ZigBee we have to
assume that the research papers care correct and are not biased.
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1.4 Goals and Limitations
This thesis is very extensive and several limitations have to be done.
The requirements for this project is as follows:
• Find the requirements for a wireless CBM system.
• Research reliability mechanisms
 Design tests for reliability issues such as delay and battery consump-
tion.
• Research security mechanisms.
 Encryption
 Authentication
• Set up a Wireless Sensor Network for CBM.
• Research diﬀerences between WirelessHART and ZigBee.
Below we outline some limitations:
• We will only implement a small number of tests in the network.
• Research security threats, but implementation of these will not be con-
ducted.
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2 Technology overview
2.1 IEEE 802.15.4
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard deﬁnes the protocol and interconnection of commu-
nication devices using low-data-rate, low power, and low complexity short-range
radio frequency (RF) in a wireless personal area network (WPAN). The standard
describes the physical layer (PHY) and the media access control (MAC).[4]
The standard support star as well as peer-to-peer topology and carrier sense
multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA-CA) media access mechanisms.
The media access is contention based, but by using the optional superframe
structure, time slots can be allocated by the network coordinator to devices
with critical data. The network coordinator can also provide connectivity to
higher performance networks.
2.1.1 Physical layer
The PHY includes two services: the PHY data service and the PHY man-
agement service. The PHY management service interfaces to the physical layer
management entity (PLME) service access point (SAP) (PLME-SAP). The PHY
data service transmits and receives PHY protocol data units (PPDU) across the
physical radio channel.
Features of the PHY includes:
• Activation and deactivation of the radio transceiver
• Energy detection(ED)
• Link quality indication(LQI)
• Channel selection
• Clear channel assessment(CCA)
• Transmitting and receiving packets across the physical medium
• The optional UWB PHY has the feature of precision ranging.
IEEE 802.15.4 includes six alternative PHYs. The PHYs are as follows:
• An 868/915 MHz direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) using binary
phase-shift keying (BPSK) modulation, and support data rates of 20kb/s,
40kb/s, and optionally 100kb/s and 250kb/s
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• An 868/915 MHz DSSS PHY using oﬀset quadrature phase-shift keying
(O-QPSK) modulation, and support data rates of 20kb/s, 40kb/s, and
optionally 100kb/s and 250kb/s
• An 868/915 MHz parallel sequence spread spectrum (PSSS) PHY using
BPSK and amplitude shift keying (ASK) modulation, and support data
rates of 20kb/s, 40kb/s, and optionally 100kb/s and 250kb/s
• A 2450 MHz DSSS PHY using O-QPSK modulation, and support data
rate of 250kb/s
• A 2450 MHz Chirp spread spectrum (CSS) PHY that supports date rates
of 1000kb/s and optionally 250kb/s
• Ultra-wide band (UWB) PHY at frequencies of 3 GHz to 5 GHz, 6 GHz
to 10 GHz, and less than 1 GHz. Support data rates of 851 kb/s with
optional data rates of 110kb/s, 6.81 Mb/s, and 27.24 Mb/s
2.1.2 Media access control
The MAC sublayer handles access to the physical radio channel and is respon-
sible for the following tasks:
• Generating network beacons for the coordinator
• Synchronization of network beacons
• Support of PAN association and disassociation
• Device security
• Employing CSMA-CA for channel access. ALOHA is used for UWB PHY.
• Handing and maintaining the Guaranteed time slot (GTS) mechanism
• Providing reliable links between two MAC entities.
2.2 ZigBee
The ZigBee protocol was developed by the ZigBee Alliance and is based on the
IEEE802.15.4 standard for low-cost, low-power, wireless communications. [13]
The ZigBee stack architecture contains a set of blocks called layers. Every
layer performs a speciﬁc set of services for the layer above. A data entity pro-
vides services for data transmissions and a management entity provides services
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for all other types of services. Each entity exposes an interface to the upper layer
through a SAP, and each SAP has a number of service primitives to accomplish
the required functions. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard deﬁnes the physical layer
and the media access control. The ZigBee protocol deﬁnes the network layer
(NWK) and the framework for the application layer.
2.2.1 Network layer
The network layer provides functionality to ensure correct operation of the IEEE
802.15.4 MAC sub-layer and also provides a service interface to application layer.
The network layer includes two service entities; the network layer data entity
(NLDE) and network layer management entity (NLME).
Network Layer Data Entity The NLDE provides data services to applica-
tions to be able to transport application protocol data units (APDU) between
two or more devices. The devices themselves has to be on the same network.
The NLDE provides the following services:
• Generation of the Network level PDU (NPDU)
The NPDU is generated from an application support sub-layer PDU through
the addition of a protocol header.
• Topology-speciﬁc routing
The NDLE is responsible for transmitting an NPDU to the device that is
the ﬁnal destination or the next step in route towards the ﬁnal destination.
• Security
The NLDE ensures that both the authencity and conﬁdentiality of a mes-
sage or transmission.
Network Layer Management Entity The NLME provides management
services to applications to be able to interact with the stack.
The NLME provides the following services:
• Conﬁguring new device
The NLME is responsible for conﬁguring the stack for required opera-
tions. Conﬁguration settings include beginning an operation as ZigBee
coordinator or joining an existing network.
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• Starting a network
The ability to start a new network.
• Joining and leaving a network
To be able to join, rejoining or leave a network. ZigBee coordinator or
ZigBee router can also request that a device leave the network.
• Addressing
So the ZigBee coordinators and routers can be able to assign addresses to
devices that is joining the network.
• Neighbour discovery
The ability to discover, record and report information regarding one-hop
neighbour devices.
• Route Discovery
To be able to discover and record routes through the network, to see if
messages are eﬃciently routed.
• Reception control
Allows a device to control when a receiver is active and for how long,
enabling MAC sub-layer synchronization or direct reception.
• Routing
To be able to use diﬀerent routing mechanisms as unicast, broadcast,
multicast or many to one to exchange data in the network.
2.2.2 Application layer
The application layer consists of the application support sub-layer (APS) and
the ZigBee device objects (ZDO).
Application support Sub-Layer
The applications support sub-layer provides an interface between the network
layer and the application layer through a set of services that are also used by the
ZDO and manufacturer-deﬁned application objects. The services are provided
by two entities; the APS data entity (APSDE) and the APS management entity
(APSME).
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Application Support Sub-Layer data Entity
The APSDE provides data service to the network layer, ZDO and application
objects to be able to transport application PDYS between two or more devices.
The APSDE provides the data transmission service via its associated SAP, the
APSDE-SAP.
The APSDE provides the following services:
• Generates application level PDU (APDU)
The APSDE takes an application PDU and generates and APS PDU by
adding the appropriate protocol overhead.
• Binding
When two devices are bound, the APSDE is able to transfer messages
from one device to the other device.
• Group address ﬁltering
Provides a function to ﬁlter group-based messages based on endpoint
group membership.
• Reliable transport
Improves the reliability of transmissions of that oﬀered by the NWK layer
alone by using end-to-end retries.
• Duplicate rejection
Messages that are transmit will no be able to received more than once.
• Fragmentation
Enables segmentation and reassebly for messages longer than the payload
of a single NWK layer frame.
Application Support Sub-Layer Management Entity
The APSME provides management services to applications to be able to in-
teract with the stack. The APSME provides the management service via its
associated SAP, the APSME-SAP. The APSME provides the binding service.
The matching of two devides are based on their services and needs, and the
APSME is able to construct and maintain a table to store this information. It
also maintains a database of managed objects, called the APS information base
(AIB).
The APSME also provides the following services:
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• Binding management
Match two devices togehther based on their services and needs.
• AIB management
To be able to get and set attributes in a device's AIB.
• Security
Set up authentic relationships between devices by using secure keys.
• Group management
Declares a single address used by several devices, to add devices to the
group and also remove devices from the group.
ZigBee Device Objects
The ZDO provides an interface between the application objects, the device
proﬁle and the APS. ZigBee Device Objects are applications that uses network
and application support layer primitives to implement ZigBee End Devices,
ZigBee Routers and ZigBee Coordinators.
The ZDO is provides the following:
• Initializing the application support sub-layer, the the network layer and
the Security Service Provider.
• Assembling conﬁguration information from end applications to determine
and implement discovery, security management, network management and
binding management.
•
2.3 XBee
In this master thesis experiments have been conducted on XBee modules from
Digi International Inc. The XBee ZB RF modules are engineered to work with
the ZigBee protocol and supports the needs of low-power wireless sensor net-
works. The modules operate within the ISM 2.4 GHz frequency band.[2]
There is a diﬀerent version of the XBee ZB RF modules, there is a Pro
version with higher ouput power, 60mW (50mW for European markets). All
tests in this thesis is conducted wit the standard version with 2mW output
power.
Key features of of the XBee XB RF modules are:
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Figure 1: Three XBee ZB 2.5 Series 2mW devices. Two in USB explorer con-
verters.
• Indoor range up to 40 m
• Outdoor line-of sight range up to 120 m
• Transmit Power Output: 2 mW (3 dBm)
• Receiver sesitivity: -96 dBm
• Data rate 250 kb/s
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2.4 XBee Power supply
Before explaining our methodology for testing power usage of the XBee devices,
we need to explain some things about batteries and power supplies that are suit-
able. The XBee requires between 2.8 volt and 3.4 volt to operate.[2] This means
it can be run directly from two 1,5 volt primary (non-rechargeable) battery cells.
But some of the most common types of rechargeable battery cells has some
problems for use with the XBee as explained below.
2.4.1 NiMH (nickel-metal hydride cell)
NiMH cells has a voltage of 1.2 volt, two cells in series produces 2.4 volts so two
cells are not enough for the XBee. Three NiMH cells produce 3.6 volt which is
too much for the XBee, so with NiMH cells a voltage regulator is needed.
NiMH cells has a self-discharge rate of 30% per month.
2.4.2 Li-ion
Li-ion battery cells has higher energy density then NiMH cells, and a very low
self-discharge rate (5-10% per month). The voltage of Li-ion cells depends on
the material used for the cathode in the cell.[7] There are 4 common cathode
materials as detailed in Table 1. For the XBee the LiFePO2 cell is the best
suited as its typical voltage is right in the range of the supply voltage of the
XBee.
Li-ion batteries have some issues when using this cell for XBee. The output
voltage of Li-ion cells vary over the discharge time.[7] From very high right after
full-charge, to below the typical voltage. The high voltage right after a charge is
a problem because it can damage the delicate circuitry of the XBee so a voltage
regulator is required for this type of battery as well.
Cathode Material Average Cell Voltage
LiCoO2 3.7 V
LiMnO2 4.0 V
LiFePO2 3.3 V
Li2FePO4F 3.6 V
Table 1: Li-ion cathode materials
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2.4.3 Voltage Regulators
In the previous sections we mentioned the need of voltage regulators, in this
section we explain the diﬀerent types and their operations.
Linear Voltage Regulators Linear voltage regulators are electronic solid-
state devices that step down DC voltage to a ﬁxed voltage.[1, 7] In Figure 2 is
a picture of a common linear regulators the LD33V in a TO-220 package. This
regulator gives 3.3V output and is a so called a ﬁxed Linear Regulator.[10]
Figure 2: 3.3 volt ﬁxed Linear Voltage Regulator LD33V
Linear regulators work by converting the excess voltage to heat. The input
current is the same as the output current,[1, 7] so if you have a 9 volt input to
a 3.3 volt ﬁxed regulator the extra input power is dissipated as heat in the heat
sink. The input voltage to the LD33V regulator in ﬁgure 2 has to be at least
1 volt higher then the output voltage (Drop-out voltage)[10]. Other regulators
will have a diﬀerent drop-out voltage the common drop-out range for normal
regulators is 1 volt to 2 volt.
If you have a 7V input voltage to a 5V regulator it's going to be 71% eﬃcient,
with a 9V input it's 56% eﬃcient, as much of the power goes to heat.
A more speciﬁc example: You have a device that draws 100mA at 5V. The
input to the linear regulator is 9V. The input to the regulator is 9V * 100mA
= 0.9 watts, but your device only uses 5V * 100mA = 0.5watts. 0.4watts is lost
to heat.
Quiescent Current If your device can sleep or uses very little power what
will matter most is the quiescent current. That is the current running through
the voltage regulator even if there is no load on the regulator drawing power. It's
also called ground current. The most common regulators have a quiescent power
of between 3mA and 10mA.[7] The quiescent current of the LD33V regulator is
typically 5mA.[10] This means 0.046 watts are lost in the 9V to 5V regulation
even if you device is sleeping and not drawing current.
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A standard 9V battery has a capacity of 625mAh. When regulating 9V to
5V a 9V battery would be drained after just over 120 hours or 5 days, without
any load and just the quiescent current draining the battery.
If the device can sleep or uses very little power one need to consider how
much the power supply is leaking current and ﬁnd a power supply option with
low quiescent power.
Switching Voltage Regulators Switching regulators are usually more eﬃ-
cient then linear regulators. A switching regulator works by switching the input
current on and oﬀ, therefore reducing the output current. A feedback loop tells
the regulator how much the regulator should turn the current on or oﬀ.[7]
The output voltage can be unstable (Voltage Jitter) and could potentially
skew things that need a stable voltage supply. (For example reading a ADC
input). A output capacitor should reduce the jitter in the current.
The data sheet states that the Quiescent Power is typically 5mA. This means
that if the device uses very little power or has a sleep mode (Like most micro
controllers) and runs oﬀ a battery, the switching regulator will drain your battery
about as fast linear regulators.
Ultra low Quiescent power Linear Regulators The alternative for low
power battery applications is devices such as MAX883 / MAX882 Linear Reg-
ulators from Maxim. These devices work the same way as standard Linear
Regulators, but are optimized for low Quiescent Power. These devices has a
Quiescent Power of 11μA or 0.011mA.[7] Or 1/500 less than the standard linear
voltage regulators and switching regulators. This means one can let the mi-
cro controller sleep without the Linear Regulator draining the power out of the
battery.
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3 Requirements of CBM
Scenario A: The sensor wakes up and do tests every 15 minutes, if the readings
are in a optimal parameters it goes back to sleep. The sensor only sends a
message if the readings are in critical condition or the battery is getting low,
the frequency of readings can be changed to suit diﬀerent scenarios.
Scenario B: The sensor wakes up in a set interval and takes tests and sends
the information to a base station. The sensor does not decide the equipments
condition, but an external device does.
3.1 Reliability requirements
3.1.1 Transmissions
In our scenario the sensor only sends a message in two cases when the equipments
that the sensor is monitoring is in a critical condition or when the battery is low.
In a CBM solution the urgency of these messages can diﬀer from task to task.
For example in a case of a furnace, where the sensor sends an alarm when the
the furnace is overheated, and its only a matter of minutes before the furnace
is damaged permanently. In this case the message have a high level of urgency
and it's important that the packet sent has a low transmission delay or doesn't
go missing. The requirements is that the network has a low transmission delay,
and have countermeasures against lost packets.
In other cases where the sensor readings are less important a long delay may
not be an issue.
3.1.2 Range
The range of devices can vary from equipment to equipment. The topology of the
network can depend on the range, if all sensors are in range of the base station
it is not necessary with a peer-to-peer topology such as wireless mesh networks,
a simple star topology might be enough. While range is not as important as
other aspects, we still need to see how we can overcome the shortcomings of a
low-range network.
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3.1.3 Battery
An important requirement for wireless sensors are the lifetime of the battery.
These sensors may be placed in places hard to reach, and is time consuming to
replace.
List of factors that can deplete battery:
• Sensor readings: The sensors are asleep until it's time to take a reading.
The frequency of readings will aﬀect battery life.
• Encryption: Encryption requires more computing power and might aﬀect
battery life.
3.2 Security requirements
Three concepts forms what is often referred to the CIA(conﬁdentiality, integrity,
availability) triad.[9] These three concepts embodies the fundamental security
objectives for both data and information and computing services. In this section
we will describe these concepts and if these concepts are required in a CBM
solution.
The concepts and the loss of security objectives are explained below.
3.2.1 Conﬁdentiality
Preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure of information. This
term covers two related concepts:
• Data conﬁdentiality: Assures that conﬁdential information is not disclosed
to unauthorized individuals.
• Privacy: Assures that individuals has control or inﬂuence over information
that is related to them may be collected and stored and who can gain these
information.
A loss of conﬁdentiality is the disclosure of unauthorized information. Only
Data conﬁdentiality is a concern when it comes to CBM. Privacy only concerns
information of individuals.
In a CBM solution conﬁdentiality might not be as important depending on
the information sent by the end devices. In Scenario A the messages only contain
the condition of a machine might not need to be conﬁdential.
In Scenario B the messages are sent more often and contains information
about the machines that need to be conﬁdential.
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3.2.2 Integrity
Guarding against improper modiﬁcation or destruction of information. This
term covers three related concepts:
• Data integrity : Assures that information and programs are changed in a
authorized manner.
• System integrity : Assures that a system performs the intended function
in a safe manner, free from unauthorized manipulation of the system.
• Authenticity : The property of being genuine and being able to veriﬁed
and trusted. The validity of a transmission, message or message originator
needs to be trusted. This means to be able to verify that the the message
comes from a trusted source.
The loss of integrity is the unauthorized modiﬁcation or destruction of informa-
tion.
In a CBM solution integrity is an important requirement. If the integrity is
compromised the system might change or shut down leading to company losses.
3.2.3 Availability
Ensuring timely and reliable access to information and use of information. The
loss of availability is the loss of access to information or loss of use of information
in a system.
Availability is important in a CBM solution. If you lose availability the
system might be disrupted and users have no information about the state of the
equipments, this might lead to shut down of industrial processes leading to lost
productivity.
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3.3 Threat Assessment
The threats against a CBM system are many and often very complex problems.
Here we are going to present some of the security threats against a wireless
CBM system.
3.3.1 Conﬁdentiality threats
In a wireless CBM system it's much easier to get access to the data, since it's not
necessary with physical access. An attacker can passively monitor the network
to gather information if it's not encrypted. The attacker just need to be within
range of of the wireless network. The range of Wireless networks varies, but in
a wireless sensor network one should expect a range of about 300 meters and
above. This means that an attacker just needs to be within 300m of the network
to monitor the information.
Even if the network is encrypted an attacker can do traﬃc analysis [12],
to get information about communication patterns and sensor activities. This
information about the traﬃc patterns can be used to identify important nodes
for further attacks.
3.3.2 Integrity threats
In a CBM system it is important that sensor readings are not corrupted in
transport to the central. If the data is corrupted and central gets the wrong
data parts may be exchanged before it's really necessary thus incurring a loss.
Also consider that if the central gets erroneous data there may be automatics
in the central that triggers and shuts down the process or gives the wrong
instructions to operators.
The main threats against wireless CBM systems is that someone intention-
ally changes the sensor readings to confuse maintenance systems. A common
attack against networks is replay attacks where an attacker captures one packet
from the network and then resend it to try and confuse the network and cause
disruptions. In the case of a replay attack, encryption wont necessarily help
since the attacker just captures the encrypted data and re-sends it. Consider an
encrypted wireless sensor network, an attacker wishing to disrupt the readings
could capture a packet then constantly resend it to the network confusing the
node that is interpreting the sensor data.
Another possible attack against wireless networks is spooﬁng attacks. In
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this type of situation an attacker forges its identity and masquerades as another
device or in some cases as many devices. This forged identity/device could
in theory fool other nodes on the network to communicating with the attackers
forged device instead of a real device. A spooﬁng attack could harm the integrity
of the sensor data, but also opens the network to many other attacks. A special
type of spooﬁng attack is the Sybil attack, in this type of attack a malicious
node creates multiple forged identities in the sensor network by fabricating or
stealing identities of legitimate nodes. Sybil attacks can be used against routing
algorithms and topology maintenance. [12] It can also reduce the eﬀectiveness
of fault tolerant systems.
3.3.3 Availability threats
The threats against availability in the case of a wireless CBM system is inten-
tional disruption, or accidental disruption. Intentional disruption is when an
individual or group intentionally tries to interrupt the communication between
nodes in the CBM system so that sensor data does not get trough to the control
room or the operators responsible. There are many ways to cause a disruptions
in a wireless sensor network, but the most signiﬁcant is jamming. Jamming is
done by using a powerful radio transmitter that operates in the same frequency
as the wireless sensor network to try and disrupt the communications between
the nodes in the sensor network. In most cases jamming is only eﬀective if the
signal between sensor nodes are already weak and the jammer device is close to
the network.
Routing loop attacks target the information exchange between nodes.[3]
False network messages are generated to trick the other nodes in the network
to route information wrong causing traﬃc increase and delays.
Accidental disruption is when an accident or unforeseen action causes the
sensor network to fail. There can be many reasons for accidental disruptions.
For example if a node in the network malfunctions, if this node is a cluster
leader or router, large parts of the network can become unavailable unless an
alternative route can be used.
3.3.4 Physical threats
This class of threats are easy to understand but can also be hard to protect
against. These threats are also valid for wired CBM systems. If an attacker
has access to the physical sensors they may change the sensors input and cause
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disruption. On wired CBM systems they can hook into the wires carrying the
sensor data and read it and change it. Modbus the most used serial protocol for
industrial automation and monitoring only has very basic readability checks on
data, 16bit CRC.[8] An determined attacker with physical access to the wires
carrying Modbus protocol data could easily intercept signals, change the data,
resend it. It's impossible for the receiver of the packet to know if the data
has been intercepted and changed because the protocol doesn't use any kind of
Encryption or Message Authentication Codes. If the attacker can subvert or
steal a node it may reveal cryptographic keys thus compromising the rest of the
sensor network.
In any CBM system good physical security is essential.
3.4 Attacks on sensor networks
We have already described the requirements of a CBM network when it comes to
conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability and threats to these requirements. In this
section we will describe attacks that aims for these security requirements.[12]
1. Passive Information Gathering
An outsider with enough resources can use a packet sniﬀer to gather data
and collect information from a sensor network.
2. Node subversion
Capture of a node to reveal its information. Usually to gain knowledge of
the cryptographic keys used in the sensor network.
3. False Node
An outsider can gather data by adding a malicious node to the network.
This node can then send malicious data to other nodes, and lure other
nodes to send data to it.
4. Node Malfunction
A malfunctioning node can cause inaccurate data that would compromise
the integrity of the network, especially if the node is a network coordinator.
5. Node Outage
When a node stops operating. This could lead to broken link from source
device to destination device.
6. Message Corruption
When the contents of a message is modiﬁed by an outsider.
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7. Traﬃc Analysis
Even when a a message is encrypted, an outsider can do analysis of the
communication patterns and sensor activities to cause harm to the net-
work.
8. Routing loops
In sensor networks routing loops attacks target the information exchanged
between two nodes. False error messages are generated when an outsider
alters and replays routing information.
9. Selective forwarding
Selective forwarding is a method to inﬂuence the network traﬃc by believ-
ing that all the participating nodes in the network are reliable to forward
the message. In a selective forwarding attack a malicious nodes simply
drop certain messages instead of forwarding every message. When a ma-
licious node receives a message it deceives the sender by reducing the
latency to make it believe it's on a shorter route. The closer the malicious
nodes is to the base station the more traﬃc it will attract. When it drops
more messages and forwards less, it retains its energy level thus remaining
powerful enough to trick neighboring nodes.
10. Sinkhole attacks
An attack that attracts the traﬃc to a compromised node. The simplest
way is to place a malicious node where it can attracts most of the traﬃc,
possible close to a base station, or the node can imitate the base station.
One of the reasons for this attack is to make selective forwarding possible
to attract traﬃc to a compromised node.
11. Sybil attacks
A type of attack where a node creates multiple illegitimate identities in a
sensor network by fabricating or stealing identities from legitimate nodes.
Sybil attacks can be used to target routing algorithms and topology main-
tenance. It also reduces eﬀectiveness of fault tolerant schemes such a
distributed storage and dispersity.
12. Wormhole attacks
In these attacks two nodes create a link over a low latency link (Ethernet
cable, optical cable or long range wireless transmission). These two nodes
convince the neighboring nodes they are closer to the base station and will
attract more traﬃc.
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13. Hello ﬂood attacks
By broadcasting a message with stronger transmission power and pre-
tending the source of the HELLO message is from the base station. Nodes
that receive this message assume that node sending the HELLO message
is closest and they try to send all their messages through this node. All
nodes will be responding to HELLO ﬂoods and waste energy. The real
base station will also be broadcasting, but will only have a few nodes
responding to it.
14. DoS attacks
Denial of service attacks occur at a physical level causing radio jamming,
interference with the network protocol, battery exhaustion etc.
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4 Reliability
4.1 Data Transmissions
ZigBee data packets can be sent as either unicast or broadcasts transmissions.
Unicast transmissions route data from one source device to a destination device.
Broadcast missions are sent to all the the devices in the network.
Data transmissions sent to a end device is treated diﬀerently because the
end device might me in sleep mode. Hence the retransmission timeout is longer
for messages meant for end devices.
4.1.1 Broadcast Transmissions
Broadcast transmissions are intended to be propagated through the entire net-
work such that all nodes receive the transmissions. To achieve this, all devices
that receive a broadcast transmissions will retransmit the packet three times.
Every nodes in the that transmits the broadcast will also make an entry in
a local broadcast transmission table. This table is used to keep track of each
received broadcast packet to ensure the packets are not endlessly transmitted.
4.1.2 Unicast Transmissions
Unicasts transmissions are sent from a source device to a destination device. The
destination device can be an immediate neighbor or several hops away from the
source device.
Every ZigBee device in the network has a 16-bit network address and a 64-
bit unique address assigned during manufacturing. Unicasts transmissions are
always routed to the 16-bit address of the destination. To ensure that data is
received by the correct device, the destination 64-bit address is often included in
the RF transmissions. Network address is not necessary static, so if a receiving
device has a matching 16-bit address of the incoming packet, but not a matching
64-bit address, it will discard the packet and obtain a new 16-bit address.
XBee ZB ﬁrmware requires that data be sent to the destination devices 64-bit
address. However, since the actual RF transmission requires 16-bit addressing,
the 16-bit address will be discovered by the XBee if not known.
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4.2 Acknowledgment
In a CBM solution we have to ensure certain frames is received, to guarantee
this we can set the acknowledgment request sub-ﬁeld to 1. When the destination
device determines the frame is valid it will generate and send an acknowledg-
ment frame to the originator of the frame. If the acknowledgment frame is not
received, the source device will re-transmit the data.
4.3 Retransmissions
A frame with its acknowledgment request sub-ﬁeld set to 0 will not be acknowl-
edged, the device will assume that the transmission was successful.
If the acknowledgment request sub-ﬁeld is set to 1, the device will wait
a certain amount of time for the acknowledgment frame to be received. If
an acknowledgment frame is received within the a set duration containing the
same cluster identiﬁer and APS counters and has the source endpoint equal
to the destination endpoint of the original frame, the transmission is seen an
successful. If an acknowledgment frame is not received within the duration, or
an acknowledgment is received but contains a wrong cluster identiﬁer or APS
counter or has a source endpoint that is not equal to the destination endpoint
of the original frame, the device will assume that the transmission has failed.
When a transmission fails, the device will repeat the process of transmitting
the frame and waiting for acknowledgment, up to a set maximum retries. If an
acknowledgment is not received after the maximum retries, the APS sub-layer
shall assume the the transmission failed and notify the higher layer of the failure.
Retransmission of a secure frame shall use the same frame counter as the
original frame.
4.4 Modes of Operation
This subsection is written by using the XBee manual as a reference.[2] Some of
these functions might not be compatible with other ZigBee devices.
4.4.1 Idle Mode
When not receiving or transmitting data, the RF module is in Idle Mode. The
device switch into other modes of operation under the following conditions.
During idle mode the device will frequently check the radio channel for incoming
data.
32
• Transmit Mode: Serial data in the serial receive buﬀer is ready to be sent.
• Receive mode: Valid RF data is received through the antenna.
• Sleep Mode: End device only. Used to lessen power consumption.
• Command Mode: Command Mode sequence is issued.
4.4.2 Transmit Mode
When serial data is received and ready to be sent, the device will exit Idle Mode
and attempt to transmit the data. The destination address determines which
node will receive the data.
Before the device attempt to transmit the data it ensures that a 16-bit
network address and a route to the destination have been established. If the
destination address is unknown, network address discovery will start. If a path is
not known, path discovery will take place to establish a path to the destination
device. The packet will be discarded if the a matching address is not discovered.
If path discovery fails to establish a path to the destination device the packet
will also be discarded. If acknowledgment request is set the device will wait for
an acknowledgment frame before entering Idle Mode again.
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Figure 3: Transmit mode sequence
4.4.3 Receive Mode
A device goes from Idle mode to Receive Mode when it detects valid data
through the antenna. The data is transferred to the serial transmit buﬀer.
4.4.4 Command mode
To read or modify RF modules parameters, the device must ﬁrst enter Command
Mode. Command Mode is a state where incoming characters are interpreted as
commands.
4.4.5 Sleep Mode
Sleep mode is only supported by end devices. Sleep mode is important for
devices running on batteries to lower power consumption. ZigBee routers and
Coordinators can not use sleep mode.
XBee end devices support two diﬀerent sleep modes:
• Pin Sleep
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• Cyclic Sleep
Pin sleep lets an external micro controller to determine when the XBee unit
should sleep and when it should wake by controlling the Sleep_RQ pin. Cyclic
sleep allows the sleep period and wake times to be conﬁgured through AT com-
mands.
During sleep mode XBee devices poll their parent (by default 100ms) to
check if there is any buﬀered data.
35
5 ZigBee Security
5.1 ZigBee security architecture
The ZigBee security architechture includes security mechanisms in the NWK
and APS layer of the protocol stack. Each layer is responsible for the secure
transport of their respective frames. The APS sublayer is responsible for the
establishment and maintenance for security relationships. The ZigBee Device
Object (ZDO) manages the security policies and the security conﬁguration for
the device.
Figure 4: Authentication and encryption with Network and APS layer security
enabled
5.2 Encryption
ZigBee uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for encryption. The AES
standard is adopted by the United States government and is one of the most
popular algorithms used for symmetric key cryptography. AES was developed
to succeed the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
The AES encryption standard AES uses a block length of 128 bits and a key
length that can be 128, 192 or 256 bits. The ZigBee standard uses a key length
of 128 bits. [9]
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The ZigBee standard uses AES with Counter with CBC-MAC (Cipher Block
Chaining-Message Authentication Code) (CCM). As the name implies CCM-
mode combines the well-known counter mode with the CBC-MAC. Counter is
used to protech against replay attacks. ZigBee uses a variation of CCM called
CCM* that allows the option of encryption and intergrity only features to CCM.
5.2.1 Network Layer Security
Network layer security can be applied to all data transmissions and is de-crypted
and re-encrypted by a hop-by-hop basis. The network key is used to encrypt the
APS layer and application data. In addition network encryption can be applied
to route request and reply messages, APS commands, and ZDO commands.
Network encryption is not applied to MAC layer transmissions such as beacon
transmissions, etc.
When a device receive a message with network encryption, it decrypts the
massage and authenticate the message. If the message is not the destination, it
then encrypts and authenticates the message, using its own frame counter and
source address in the network header.
Since network encryption is performed each hop, the packet delay is slightly
longer compared to an un-encrypted network.
5.2.2 APS Layer Security
APS encryption is used to encrypt application data using a key that is shared
between source and destination devices. Where network layer security is applied
to all data transmissions and is decrypted and re-encrypted by a hop-by-hop
basis, APS security is optional and provides end-to-end encryption using a link
key only known to source and destination devices.
Packets with APS layer encryption appends a 4-byte Message Intergrity
Code, the maximun data payload is reduced by 4 bytes when APS encryption
is applied.
5.3 Message Integrity
The network header, APS header and application data are all authenticated
with AES-128. A hash is performed on all of these ﬁelds and is appended as
a 4-byte message intergrity code (MIC) to the end of the packet. The MIC
allows the destination devices to check and ensure that the message has not
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been corrupted or tampered with. If a device receives a packet with a MIC that
does not match the device's own hash, the packet is dropped. The MIC can be
set to 32, 64, or 128-bit. The bitlength of the MIC determines the probability
that a random guess of the MIC would be corrects. XBee however only supports
a 32-bit MIC length.[2]
5.4 Address ﬁltering
This is a low-level security mechanism that is speciﬁed in the IEEE 802.15.4
standard and is called Access Control List (ACL) mode.[4]By using ACL all
nodes within the network will only accept MAC frames from authorized nodes
listed in the ACL of the device.
5.5 Security keys
Security in a ZigBee network are based on Link keys and Network keys. End-
to-end communication between two devices is encrypted using a 128-bit Link
key. Network keys is known by the entire network and is used for broadcast
transmissons and secured by a 128-bit network key. The intended recipient
always know if a frame is protected by a network key or a link key.
Devices acquires link keys either through key transport, key-establishment,
or pre-installation (factory installation or a physical interface). A network key is
acquired through key-transport or pre-installation. A master key is acquired by
key-transport or pre-installation. The key-establishment for link key are based
on the master key.
5.6 Key establishment
The APS sublayer includes the key-establishment services used to provide a
ZigBee device with the mechanism to acquire the secret link key with another
ZigBee device. Key establishment involved two entities, the initiatior device
and the responder device, and is prefaced by a trust-provisioning step.
Trust information like a master key provides a starting point for establishing
a link key. The link key can be provisioned in-band or out-of-band. The key-
establishement protocol involves three steps:
1. Exchange of ephemeral data.
2. The use of this data to derive the link key.
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3. Conﬁrmation that the link key was correctly computed.
The Symmetric-Key Key Establishment (SKKE) protocol uses the the master
key for the iniatior device to establish a link key with the responder device.
The master key can be can be pre-installed, installed by a Trust Center (for
example, the initinator, the responder, or a device acting as Trust Center), or
it can be based on used-entered data (PIN, password, or key).
5.7 Key transport
The network is dependent on reliable transfer of security keys. When a device
that does not have an initial key pre-loaded it must receive the ﬁrst key over-the-
air leading to a brief moment of vulnerability. However the transportation of the
key can be secured by non-cryptographic means, for example by communicating
the through an out-of-band channel. After receving the master key all other
communication can be encrypted to ensure secrecy.
5.8 Trust Center
The Trust Center is the device trusted by the devices within a network. The
Trust Center is responsible for the distribution of the security keys in the net-
work. All members within a network shall recognize only one Trust Center, and
there shall only be one Trust Center in each secure network.
The Trust Center address can be pre-loaded along with the initial mas-
ter/network key. If not pre-loaded the Trust Center defaults to the ZigBee
coordinator or a device designated the by the ZigBee coordinator.
Devices within a ZigBee network only accepts initial master, network and
updated network keys only from its Trust Center. Master and link keys used
for establishing end-to-end security between two devices is only accepted from
its Trust Center. After the ﬁrsti nitial master key or network key, additional
link, master, and network keys are generally only accepted if the come from a
device's Trust Center through secured key transport.
The Trust Center shall be conﬁgured to operate in either standard or high
security mode and can be used to help establish end-to-end application keys by
sending out link keys directly or by sending master keys. These keys shall be
generated at random.
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5.8.1 High Security Mode
The high security mode of the Trust Center is designed for high security com-
mercial applications. The Trust Center maintains a list of devices, master keys,
link keys and network keys that it needs to control and enforce the policies
of network key updates and network admittance. In high security mode, the
memory required for the Trust Center grows with the number of devices in the
network. In this mode the Trust Center also mandates the implementation of
key establishment using SKKE and entity authentication.
5.8.2 Standard Security Mode
The standard security mode is designed for lower-security residential applica-
tions. The Trust Center maintains a list of devices, master keys, link keys and
network keys with all the devices within the network, however it maintains a
standard network key and control policies for network admittance. In lower
security mode the memory required for the Trust Center doesn't grow with the
number of devices in the network.
The XBee units used in this thesis only supports Standard Security mode.
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6 Comparison of WirelessHART and ZigBee
Although having existed since late 2004, ZigBee has yet to to prove its success
in the industrial evironment. In this section we'll give you a short introduction
to WirelessHART and compare it to ZigBee by discussing the issues ZigBee has
been criticized for and look at how WirelessHART addresses these issues. [5]
6.1 WirelessHART
WirelessHART by HART Communication is based on the PHY layer in the
IEEE 802.15.4 standard. The WirelessHART protocol speciﬁes new Data-ling
(including MAC), Network, Transport and Application layers.
WirelessHART is designed based on a set of fundamental requirements: it
must be simple (easy to use and deploy), self organizing and self-healing, ﬂex-
ible (support for diﬀerent applications), scalable (ﬁt for both small and big
networks), reliable, secure and support existing HART technology.
WirelessHART is a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) based network.
In a TDMA based network all devices have to be time synchronized and com-
munication is based on pre-scheduled time slots.
WirelessHART has several mechanisms to avoid interference: Frequency
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) allows WirelessHART to hop across 16 chan-
nels deﬁned in the IEEE802.15.4 standard. Clear Channel Assessment is an
optional feature that is can be performed before transmitting a message, the
transmission power is conﬁgurable, and a Blacklist feature that disallows cer-
tain channels.
6.2 Comparison
WirelessHART and ZigBee is based on the OSI Seven Layer Model. While
ZigBee is built on top of the Data Link and Physical layers speciﬁed in IEEE
802.15.4 adding new Application and Network layers, WirelessHART replaces
the Data Link layer of 802.15.4 including a new Media Access Control (MAC).
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Figure 5: WirelessHART and ZigBee protocol stacks
6.2.1 Frequency agility
Frequency agility is the ability to switch frequencies of a transmitter to reduce
interference from other sources. WirelessHART uses Frequency Hopping Spread
Spectrum which allows it to hop between frequencies, when a frame fails to be
delivered the retransmission of that frame will be retransmitted in a diﬀerent
frequency.
ZigBee uses Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum with only one frequency and
the network shares one channel. The ZigBee network chooses the channel with
the least amount of interferences at startup. Because of the lack of ZigBees
frequency agility makes it highly susceptible for unintended and intended jam-
ming.
6.2.2 Devices
ZigBee devices can be either Full-Function Devices or Reduced-Function De-
vices. The former can act as a router in the network and can also be the
network coordinator, the latter can only communicate with known routers.
All devices in aWirelessHART network has routing capabilities and is treated
equally, this makes it highly versatile. However this won't make it suitable to
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run on batteries if all the devices act as routers. Fortunately WirelessHART
devices can be set up with only communication functionality.
6.2.3 Path diversity
ZigBee has no path diversity meaning that if a link is broken, a new path from
source destination have to be set up. ZigBee devices are responsible for route
discovery, and this will delay the delivery of the frame since a new route has to
discovered before retransmitting the frame.
WirelessHART uses two diﬀerent mechanisms for message routing: Graph
routing and source routing. Graph routing uses pre-determined paths to route
messages from source to destination device. A graph route has several diﬀerent
paths between source and destination. If a link is broken the device will relay
the message using a diﬀerent path. Source routing uses ad-hoc created paths
without any path diversity. Source routing is therefore only intended for network
diagnostics and not process related messages.
6.2.4 Channel access methods
ZigBee uses CSMA/CA to access the radio channel. This means that if a device
wishes to transmit a frame it has to listen to the channel for a certain amount
of time to check if the channel is busy. If the channel is idle the transmission
will start. If the channel is busy the transmission will be delayed for a random
interval. Important frames can be ensured access to the radio channel by using
guaranteed time slots (GTS).
WirelessHART uses TDMA for accessing the radio channel. TDMA uses
pre-scheduled timeslots to avoid message collisions. This requires all devices
to be synchronized, but this requires to additional network traﬃc because it is
embedded in the automation process related traﬃc.
6.2.5 Security
Security in ZigBee is not mandatory. However there is support for encryp-
tion, authentication and integrity. ZigBee uses security mechanisms in 802.15.4;
Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) with AES-128 encryption.
Three keys are used in ZigBee: Master key, Link key and Network key. The
Master key is used to join the network. The Link key is used for end-to-end
encryption. The Network key is shared between all the devices. All keys can be
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set at the factory, or be given from the trust center over the air, or through a
physical interface.
Security in WirelessHART is mandatory. There is no option to turn it com-
pletely oﬀ. Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) with AES-128 is used in Wire-
lessHART as well.
Three keys are used in WirelessHART: Join key, Network key and Session
key. The join key is similar to ZigBees Master key and is used to authenticate
a device for a speciﬁc WirelessHART network. After the device has success-
fully joined the network the Network manager will supply it with Network and
Session keys used for further communication. The actual key generation and
management is handled by a Security manager, which is not speciﬁed by Wire-
lessHART, but the keys are distributed by the Network manager. The Session
key is used for authentication of end-to-end communications between two de-
vices. For example Field device and the Gateway. Diﬀerent session keys are used
for each pairwise communication. (Field device and Gateway, Field device and
network manager, etc). The Data Link layer uses Network key to authenticate
messages on a one-hop basis.
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Figure 6: Standalone XBee Router with power supply circuit and battery.
7 Methodology
7.1 XBee
For all the test we use Digi XBee Series 2.5 devices with 2mW radio output and
a wire antenna. There are other XBee versions that are a bit diﬀerent. But
the only diﬀerence is the power output. [2] The Pro version has a power output
of 60mW. The 2mW version still gives us a good overview over the XBee's
capabilities. As the only diﬀerence to expect from the higher radio output
version is longer range.
In Figure1 we show two of the XBee devices are in USB explorer units. The
USB explorer is used to connect the XBee to a computer with a USB port. The
explorer works as a serial converter. We use this explorer to read and write data
and API frames to and from XBee devices.
7.1.1 Standalone XBee router
For testing some of the mesh functionality we use a standalone XBee Router.
Figure 6 shows a picture of the circuit with a battery attached. The schematic
over this this circuit is similar to the device described in Figure 13 but without
the temperature and light sensor. The circuit is basically a XBee and a power
supply, powered with a battery. The XBee in this circuit is set up as a Router
and is used to extend the range of the network without using a PC.
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7.1.2 Setup
For all our tests with XBee devices we use the same setup. Each device is set
up to use the full Zigbee stack. The name of the ﬁrmware used is XB24-ZB
this ﬁrmware provides the full Zigbee protocol stack for all XBee Devices. The
reasons for doing this is that we want to test how the Zigbee standard protocol
works. For a Zigbee network to be functional it needs exactly one Coordinator
and one or more End Devices/Routers. So at least one device in each test is set
to be a coordinator.
7.1.3 Network Setup
For all tests we use mesh networking, as that conﬁguration is the most interesting
for the applications we have in mind for Wireless Sensor Networks (CBM). In
CBM applications it's important that it's easy to add new devices without need
for to much setup. A device should be set in the environment and ﬁnd it's own
route to it's destination. Mesh networking provides this.
7.2 Tools Created
For making some of the measurements we needed some new tools. Here we
describe the functions of all the tools we created and used for measuring diﬀerent
properties of XBee devices. The tools where written in Perl. Perl is good for
fast prototyping and we know the language.
7.2.1 Perl modules
Here follows a short description of the Perl modules we wrote to make tool
development easier. The modules are used in the tools as a Object Oriented
interface to diﬀerent functions of the XBee devices and to interface to generate
API frames. The modules implement most of the XBee speciﬁcation for AT
commands and API frames.
Xbee/AT.pm This is a modules that implements serial communications
with the XBee device and implements functions for entering into AT command
mode and reading/writing AT registers. AT mode is transparent meaning that
all data sent to the serial port of the XBee device in AT mode is sent directly to
the node speciﬁed in the Destination Node register (Usually the Coordinator).
All data from the network is received trough the serial port without any added
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Algorithm 1 Example usage of Xbee/AT.pm module
use Xbee::AT;
# Create a new Xbee::AT object connected to /dev/ttyUSB0 serial port.
my $xbee = Xbee::AT->new( {port => '/dev/ttyUSB0', speed => 115200} );
$xbee->write(data); # Send data to the destination node.
my $dbm = $xbee->rssi; # Read the signal level register.
Algorithm 2 Example usage of Xbee/API.pm module
use Xbee::API;
my $xbee = Xbee::API->new( {port => '/dev/ttyUSB0', speed => 115200} );
# Wait for API frames and dump the received data
while ( my $hash = $xbee->read_api) {
print $hash->{data},\n;
}
control structures. This makes AT mode simple to program for as one just needs
to implement reading and writing to a serial port. The module enters command
mode automatically if the program using the module requests reading or writing
to registers.
Xbee/API.pm This module implements most of the XBee API frame speci-
ﬁcation. This makes it possible to address speciﬁc nodes in the network without
setting a destination register ﬁrst. The API mode is not transparent and all
data sent to the the XBee in API mode needs to follow the API frame speciﬁca-
tion. API mode is the only way to get and parse join notiﬁcations and sample
frames that are sent out by nodes just joining the network and nodes sending
out samples. API mode is most useful on the XBee Coordinator as it's usually
just this node that needs to read join notiﬁcations, sample frames and needs to
address speciﬁc nodes in the network.
7.2.2 Perl Tools
Here follows a short description of the tools created for taking the actual mea-
surements and for getting a better overview of the protocol.
api_echo.pl This Perl program uses the Xbee/API.pm module for echoing
back all data it receives back to the node that sent the data. We used this
program on the Coordinator node when measuring round trip time for packets
traversing the network. Also records changes to the routes taken by packets
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from other nodes by parsing Route Record Indicator.
ping.pl This Perl program uses Xbee/AT.pm module for sending high reso-
lution time data to the Coordinator. After sending this time packet it waits to
get the data back After getting it back it calculates the time the packed used
to traverse the network using the time data in the packet and the current local
time. The size of the time packet is 10 bytes and ﬁts in one packet (ZigBee
packets are up to 56 bytes).
After calculating the delay the program reads the Signal Level register. This
register contains the signal level of the last packet received in dBm. This is the
signal level of the ping packet sent earlier. After reading the signal level the
program prints out the calculated delay and signal level. This data is then used
to plot the delay on a graph/scatter plot.
analog.pl This Perl program uses the Xbee/API.pm module to receive analog
measurements from XBee devices that are programmed to take periodic mea-
surements from their analog ADC ports. The measurements are usually sent to
the Coordinator, so this program runs behind the Coordinator node receiving
sample frames. Sample frames contain the senders address, serial number and
a bit ﬁeld that tells what sample ports are enabled. From the bit ﬁeld one can
read the 10-bit analog samples. The XBee device has 4 ADC ports so the sam-
ple packet can contain up to 4 analog samples. You can connect many diﬀerent
sensors to the ADC ports, for example a temperature sensor or a light sensor.
analog.pl parses the sample packet and takes the samples and put it in a
simple database, using the device serial number and the pin number as the key.
This program was used to run long running tests of the analog sample taking
capability of XBee sensors.
check.pl Using Xbee/API.pm, this program tries to enumerate all nodes con-
nected to the current network by sending a Node Discovery request. After send-
ing the requests it waits for replies from the other nodes on the network. For
each packet received after the initial Node Discovery request the serial number
of the answering node is printed out.
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Figure 7: X-CTU Port selection screen
7.3 X-CTU
X-CTU is a Windows program created by Digi for conﬁguring and testing XBee
devices. We use this program for conﬁguring the XBee devices we use for testing.
X-CTU takes care of both ﬂashing the XBee devices with new ﬁrmware and
settings options.
Figure 7 shows the port selection screen where one can select witch serial
port the XBee device is connected to and which mode it's running on. If it's
running in API mode once needs to select API mode for communications to
work.
Figure 8 shows the main conﬁguration screen, the most notable options here
is the Modem: which sets the ﬁrmware to ﬂash the XBee device with. In the
Figure it's set to XB24-ZB which is the ﬁrmware that contains the full Zigbee
protocol stack. Function Set sets the function set and the mode the XBee
device is running. This can be set to Coordinator, Router or End Device. The
mode is either AT or API. The tree view shows all the options of the XBee
device, some of the options are read only (Black). For example the Operating
Pan Id is set when the node joins a network while the option Join Notiﬁcation
is read/write and can be set to 1 so that the devices sends a join notiﬁcation
broadcast when it joins a network.
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Figure 8: X-CTU Conﬁguration screen
Figure 9: X-CTU Range test screen
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Figure 9 shows the range test screen, this tool can be used to test the range
of the XBee devices. This screen shows how many packets got through and the
signal level RSSI. The signal level indicator is in dBm, or the power ratio in
decibels of the measured power to 1mW. A dBm value of -40 (Typical for a
strong signal in XBee networks) is 100nW (Nanowatt) received by the antenna.
-80 dBm is a weak signal at just 10 pW (Picowatt) received.
We found that this tool is not ﬂexible enough for the tests we had in mind so
we created our own tools that mimic some of the functions of this tool, plus some
extra tools like Round Trip Time and data logging. These tools are described
in section 7.2.
7.3.1 Register List and Descriptions
Here follows a list of the most important registers that can be set or read on
XBee Devices ﬂashed with the XB24-ZB ﬁrmware. The number of options diﬀers
according to the ﬁrmware and the mode of operation. For example Coordinators
and Routers does not have some Sleep Options
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Long Name Name Description
Pan ID ID Read/Write. Sets the PAN ID this node should operate on. If this
register is 0 then the coordinator uses a random pan id. Routers and
End Devices connect to the ﬁrst available pan id if this is set to 0.
Operating Pan ID OP Read Only. The pan id this node is currently connected to.
Remaining children NC Read Only. The number of child nodes that can connect to this
node. If this register is 0 no other nodes can join this node. Only
valid for Routers and Coordinator nodes.
Destination Address DH/DL Read/Write. Sets the high and low part of the 64-bit destination
address (Serial Number)
Node Identiﬁer NI Read/Write. Sets a string that identiﬁes this node. Used to look up
network addresses.
Serial Number SL/SH Read Only. The serial number of this node. This is the serial
number that should be set in the Destination ID of nodes addressing
this node.
Network Address MY This nodes 16-bit Network Address
Encryption Enable EE Read/Write. If set to 0 no encryption is used. Set to 1 means
encryption is used.
Encryption Key KY Write Only. Link key used to communicate with trust center. This
register has to be set to securely distribute network key.
Sleep Mode SM Read/Write. End device only. 0 = No sleep. 1 - Sleep until sleep pin
(Pin 9) transitions from high to low. 4 = Wake up on timer. (Cyclic
Sleep). 5 - Wake up on Sleep pin or Timer.
Sleep Period SP Read/Write. Sleep period of the network. This value should be the
same on all nodes of the network.
Time before sleep ST Read/Write. End device only. Sets the number of seconds of
inactivity before going to sleep.
Cyclic Sleep Periods SN Read/Write. Sets the number of Sleep Periods a End Device should
sleep before waking up and polling it's parent router for data.
Sleep Options SO Read/Write. Sets the sleep options bit-ﬁeld for End Devices. 0x02 -
Wake for Time Before Sleep on each cyclic wake (after sleeping
SN*SP). 0x04 - Enable extended cyclic sleep (sleep for entire SN*SP
time - possible data loss)
Route Broadcast Time AR Read/Write. The time between aggregation route broadcast time.
An aggregation route broadcast creates a route on all devices in the
network back to the devices that sends the aggregation broadcast.
0xFF=disabled. 0x00=Sends one broadcast.
Table 3: Some Important XBee Registers
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7.4 Testing battery usage
Because we only have standard linear regulators for the power supply, we have to
measure the power usage after the regulator to get an accurate reading. Section
2.4.3 explains how linear regulators works. We need to measure the current after
the power supply because the power supply itself will use signiﬁcant amount of
current skewing results. This is especially important when measuring the power
usage of XBee devices because it can sleep and use very little power. The nodes
we use for these tests are XBee ZB Nodes from Digi. The power usage was
tested using a oscilloscope and a 10Ω shunt resistor. This was done to study
the power usage proﬁle, or how the power usage changes over time. This shows
us what the power consumptions is in the diﬀerent modes of operation, if the
Radio is on or if the CPU is active.
A shunt is a device that allows current to pass around another point in the
circuit. The voltage drop over a shunt is proportional to the current running
through it, and since the resistance of the shunt is known, one can measure the
voltage drop and calculate the amount of current running through using Ohms
Law.
For example a current of 1 ampere through a 1Ω shunt will generate a 1
volt drop over the resistor and shows up as 1 volt reading on an oscilloscope. In
reverse if one measures 0.5V over the shunt and the resistance of the shunt is 1Ω
the current running through the shunt is 0.5 ampere. This method of measuring
current is mostly used in situations with very high current where measuring it
directly is not an option. Using this method for the low currents XBee uses,
is not very accurate but it clearly shows how the power usage changes in the
diﬀerent modes of operation.
The XBee device uses 3.3 volt as supply volatage in all tests.
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7.5 Delay Measurements
7.5.1 Round Trip Time
The round trip time is measured by taking the time used from node to the
destination and then back again to the original node. We take measurements
using two programs listed below.
api_echo.pl This program listens for packets coming from the sensor network
and sends the same packet back to the node that sent it. This
program runs on the coordinator node. This program also records
the route packes take by reading Route Record Indicator frames,
this information is used to verify what path a packet has taken.
ping.pl This program encodes a high resolution time object representing the
local time on the computer, then sends this encoded packet to the
coordinator of the network. The program then waits for the packet
to return and then decodes the packet and compares it to the current
local time, eﬀectively ﬁnding how long the packet took from the local
node to the coordinator and back again. After calculating the round
trip time the program reads the signal level on the XBee to ﬁnd the
signal level of the last packet received. After reading the signal level
it prints out the round trip time and the signal level.
7.5.2 Hop
Zigbee uses mesh networking techniques so it's interesting to know how much
the delay will increase if a packet has to traverse several routes before getting
to it's destination. These measurements where taken by running the ping.pl
program on a mobile platform (laptop) and ﬁrst moving out of range of the
XBee Coordinator, then placing a new XBee Router node just within range of
the XBee Coordinator. The next step is to move in the same direction until the
signal from the XBee Router node is also lost. Then we place a second XBee
Router node just within range of the ﬁrst XBee Router.
To verify which route a packet took trough the network, we use the Route
Record Indicator frames received by the coordinator. These frames contain all
the routers a packet has to traverse to get to it's destination.[2] This type of
frame is only sent on a set interval (See section 7.3.1 for a description of the
AR register that controls the route aggregation broadcast time. ) so after a
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test run we have to compare timestamps of the round trip time packet with the
timestamps of Route Record Indicator.
7.5.3 Encrypted Link vs. Unencrypted Link
For a wireless sensor network to be secure one may need to use encryption. It's
interesting to see how this eﬀects the delay of packets traversing the network.
This test was done using the same tools as in Section 7.5.1. First a XBee network
with two nodes was created without encryption enabled. The round trip time
over diﬀerent signal levels where measured. Then the network was conﬁgured
to use encryption and the round trip time tests where done again.
Figure 10: Picture taken of Vigeland Metal Reﬁnery taken from the other side
of the river Ora.
Figure 11: Schematic drawing of Power Rail path at Vigeland Metal Reﬁnery
AS
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Figure 12: Picture taken of factory Hall C facing south.
7.6 Tests in industrial environment
This section covers how we tested the XBee devices in an industrial environment.
7.6.1 Environment Description
We tested the XBee sensor on the factory ﬂoor at Vigeland Metal Reﬁnery A/S.
This environment has some interesting obstacles for the sensors to overcome.
Especially magnetic ﬁelds generated by the current running trough furnaces and
power rails. While testing the current running trough the furnaces and the rails
was 36000 ampere. This current generates signiﬁcant magnetic ﬁelds in the
whole factory. The magnetic ﬁelds are known to block signals to mobile phones.
XBee sensors run on a diﬀerent frequency than mobile phones but may be
aﬀected in a similar way. Other obstacles are concrete walls separating diﬀerent
parts of the factory and large metallic bodies (furnaces and other equipment)
that may stand in the way of the signal.
Figure 11 shows the path the power rail takes through the factory. The
current runs through every furnace from the bottom up through the liquid
aluminum and out of the furnace via electrodes. The most signiﬁcant magnetic
ﬁelds are close to the power rail.
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7.6.2 Magnetic ﬁeld eﬀect test
The eﬀect of the magnetic ﬁeld on the XBee devices was tested by ﬁrst measuring
the delay and signal strength at a location with lesser magnetic ﬁelds. Then
we moved the XBee device into a location with a stronger magnetic ﬁeld (Close
to power rails, or between furnaces) but still at the same length away from the
Coordinator or router.
7.6.3 Coverage Test
The coverage was tested by using a mobile platform with a XBee and running
a ping program to see if the signal comes trough and how strong the signal is.
Measurements where then taken in key locations round the factory at about
one meter height over the factory ﬂoor. New router nodes where added to cover
areas not covered by other nodes to ﬁnd how many nodes would be needed to
cover the whole factory.
For this test we used two of the standalone XBee Routers described in Section
7.1.1.
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Figure 13: Schematic over test setup with XBee, Power supply, LM35DZ tem-
perature sensor and TEMP6000 light sensors
Figure 14: Prototype of the schematic in Figure 13 on a breadboard.
7.7 Implementing Test Sensor
For testing the periodic sample taking functionality of the XBee devices it is
necessary to create a circuit with some analog sensors. Figure 13 shows the
circuit of the remote sensor. It has two analog sensors, one for temperature and
one for light, described in detail in the next section.
The reasons we want to test this functionality is that if the XBee can be
used for reading analog sensors one can cut down on the number OS devices
needed to take measurements, reducing cost and complexity.
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7.7.1 LM35DZ Centigrade Temperature Sensor
The LM35DZ is a analog centigrade temperature sensor. This sensor output
10mV (Milli-volt) on pin two for each degree centigrade over 0 degrees centi-
grade. For example a output of 205mV is 20,5 degrees. Pin two of the temper-
ature sensor is connected to Pin 20 (DIO0) of the XBee. The XBee can then
read the mV value from the temperature sensor.
7.7.2 TEMT6000 Light Sensor
The TEMT6000 Light sensor combined with a 10kΩ pull-down resistor gives a
varying volt output depending on the light intensity hitting the sensor. Figure
13 shows how the light sensor is connected to Pin19 (DIO1) of the XBee. The
XBee can then read the mV value and get a light level reading.
7.7.3 Power supply
The power supply is a voltage regulator named REG1/LD33V in Figure 13.
This part of the circuit provides 3.3 V for the rest of the circuit. C1 and C2
are capacitors to keep the voltage output of the linear regulator stable, and to
provide a stable feedback loop to the regulator.
7.7.4 XBee Setup
The XBee is set up to take measurements of DIO0 and DIO1 analog pins every
30 seconds and send it to a Coordinator. This is done by setting the sampling
rate register (IR) to 30000 milliseconds and D0 and D1 to 4 (Analog Input).
The coordinator then receives the samples and stores the samples using the
analog.pl program described in Section 7.2.2.
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8 Test Results
8.1 XBee Power Usage
The power usage of the XBee devices depend on the mode it's running in. Below
we cover what kind of power usage one should expect from Coordinator nodes,
Router nodes and End Nodes.
8.1.1 XBee Coordinator
Our tests show that the XBee Coordinator node draws a constant current of
about 40mA. According to the general product speciﬁcation the XBee should
draw 40mA when the radio is turned on. This means that the coordinator has
the radio turned on constantly. The coordinator needs to keep it's radio on
constantly to ensure minimal delay and retransmissions. In this mode the XBee
routers draws 0.136 watts excluding all power supply circuits.
8.1.2 XBee Router
The router nodes has the same power usage proﬁle as the coordinator. The
router nodes draw a constant 40mA, this means the router nodes also keeps the
radio on constantly. The reason both the Coordinator and Routers keep the
radio on is that they need to listen for requests from all other devices within
range. This means that Routers and Coordinators are not designed to run oﬀ a
battery. In this mode the XBee routers draws 0.136 watts excluding all power
supply circuits.
8.1.3 XBee End Device
End devices, in contrast to Coordinators and Routers have the option of sleeping
and going into idle and are designed to run oﬀ a battery. Our tests show that
End devices in idle mode use 8-10mA, this is close to the speciﬁcation. In sleep
mode the power draw is below the threshold of our measurement equipment.
But the speciﬁcation tells us that the power down current is 0.5µA. Figure 15
shows a XBee conﬁgured as an End Device in a 5s sleep cycle. This means
that the node sleeps for 5 seconds, wakes and takes a analog measurement of
one Analog pin and sends a packet to the coordinator with the measured value.
Here one can see that the device ﬁrst sleeps near 0mV wakes up to idle at 100mV
(or about 10mA). The peaks is up to 400mV (about 40mA) are measured when
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Figure 15: 10Ω shunt voltage. XBee End Device. Shows a XBee End device in
5s sleep cycle mode, where it wakes up every 5 seconds and sends an IO sample.
the device turns on the radio to send or receive data. Figure 16 shows a XBee
end device transitioning from idle to sending/receiving (radio on) then back to
idle. This is a closeup of one of the peeks in Figure 15. The radio is on about 5
milliseconds at a time in this case, and draws about 40mA. As the XBee draws
this current at 3.3 volt the peak instantaneous power usage is 0.132 watts for 5
milliseconds at a time.
XBee End devices can sleep for extended periods thus saving battery in
applications where the end device only needs to send samples on a cycle. If
the end device needs to receive data it needs to wake up to check if the router
it's joined to has data waiting. The router will not keep this data waiting
indeﬁnitely, thus the end device needs to wake up every SP (Sleep Period)
seconds to query the router for data. The Sleep Period should be the same for
all end devices and routers to ensure that Routers keep the data in the waiting
queue long enough for the end device to wake up and get the data.
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Figure 16: 10Ω shunt voltage. XBee End Device. Shows a XBee End device
going from idle to sending/receiving mode back to idle. The peek lasts about 5
milliseconds.
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8.2 Delay measurements
8.2.1 1 Hop delay
Figure 17 shows a scatter plot over the round trip time versus the signal level.
One can see that the round trip time is usually between 50-70 milliseconds.
Once the signal degrades the delay gets more unpredictable. This is due to
packets not getting through and needs to be resent.
8.2.2 1-3 Hop delay
Figure18 shows the delay for 1 hop, 2 hops and 3 hops. The Figure shows that
for each hop the delay increases but not by much.
XBee seems to prefer linking to routers that are fewer hops away from the
coordinator, this made measuring the delay of 3 hops diﬃcult. We could see the
mobile XBee relinking with the ﬁrst router even if the signal strength was much
worse than the signal level for the second router. The speciﬁcation doesn't say
anything about this behavior but we assume that this is intentional as packets
that has to traverse fewer hops creates less traﬃc on the network.
8.2.3 1 Hop delay on encrypted versus unencrypted link
Figure 19 shows a averaged scatter plot over delays for both encrypted and en-
crypted links. The measurements where taken with a XBee router node sending
packets to a coordinator that sends that same packet back. First without any
encryption options set and then with encryption enabled. Here the delay for
each signal level has been averaged to show more clearly that the encrypted link
has a slightly higher average delay. The diﬀerence is small 10-15milliseconds but
10 milliseconds here means the delay is over 10% higher when using encrypted
link.
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Figure 17: Scatter plot over round trip time versus signal level.
Figure 18: Averaged scatter plot over delay for 1 hop, 2 hops and 3 hops.
Figure 19: Averaged scatter plot of round trip times versus signal level for
unencrypted link and encrypted link.
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8.3 Results from our tests at Vigeland Metal reﬁnery
8.3.1 Eﬀects of the general environment
The eﬀect of thick concrete walls is signiﬁcant, the signal strength drops oﬀ when
the mobile XBee moves out of the line of sight of the coordinator or router, and
comes behind concrete walls. The eﬀect of other objects in the signals path like
(Furnaces, steel drums, etc) also has a negative eﬀect on the signal but much
less then the negative eﬀect of solid concrete walls.
8.3.2 Eﬀect of Magnetic ﬁelds on XBee
We could not discern any eﬀect of magnetic ﬁelds on XBee devices, both on
delay and signal strength. Even very close to the power rails (Where the mag-
netic ﬁeld is the strongest) there seems to be no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the signal
strength or packet delay. We also tried testing XBee devices in the 1 meter gap
between furnaces where the magnetic ﬁeld is strong, but we could still not see
any signiﬁcant drop in the signal strength.
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Figure 20: Coverage Map
8.3.3 Coverage test
Figure 20 shows the approximate coverage of the Coordinator and two Router
nodes. The whole factory is covered with 3 nodes placed in key locations. We
needed three is because parts of the factory halls are cut oﬀ by concrete walls
interrupting the signal giving higher and unstable round trip times. By placing
two routers within the line of sight of the coordinator they cover the whole
factory with high enough signal strength.
At the end of hall D (Right in Figure 20) the signal strength starts to drop
oﬀ but is still strong enough to give short and stable round trip times. The
signal has to travel approximately 150 meter from the router to the end oﬀ hall
D, the path the signal can take is mostly free air but even if the signal has to
travel trough several furnaces the signal strength does not drop enough to aﬀect
the round trip times.
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Figure 21: Sample of data captured with the sensor circuit described in Section
7.7.
8.4 Sensor test results
Using the XBee device as a standalone device with two analog sensors attached
works as expected. Figure 21 shows an example of the data captured with the
sensor circuit described in section 7.7. The data was captured in a server room
over 20 days. There where two outtakes where samples where not gathered,
Apr 30 - May 01 and May 04 - May 07. Both outtakes happened because the
machine that captured the samples was not running and had nothing to do with
the performance of the XBee devices.
The y-axis is in mV because the sensors attached to the XBee are analog.
The temperature sensor outputs 10mV per centigrade above 0. A reading of
300mV means 30 centigrade.
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9 Discussion
9.1 Choosing a network topology
ZigBee supports star topology as well as peer-to-peer networks such as wireless
mesh.[13] A company should choose a topology depending on the physical lo-
cation of the equipment. If all the equipment is close enough together a star
topology is the best choice. In a star topology all the devices can only commu-
nicate with the ZigBee coordinator making it only one hop to reduce latency.
The ZigBee coordinator can also use GTS to ensure that all the devices gets to
send their information.
Figure 22: Star topology network
When the equipments are further away and the ZigBee coordinator can not
reach all of the end devices, designated routers have to be set up. In this case a
wireless mesh network can be used. A wireless mesh network is self-healing and
self-organizing. ZigBee networks consists of two types of devices: Full Function
Devices (Routers, Coordinators) and Reduced Function Devices (End devices).
An end device can only communicate with ZigBee routers that are their parents.
Messages meant for end devices is stored by the parent router until end device
receives the data when it polls the router, hence a network should be set up in
such a way that a there is a parent for every end device.
To expand the network with equipment that are further away you can use a
cluster tree network. In a cluster tree network only PAN coordinators can com-
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municate with each other. Each cluster can be set up with either star topology
or wireless mesh. Additionally only end-devices should run on batteries, while
routers and coordinators should not. Routers and coordinators is required to be
always on, and depending on the use the battery could be drained in a matter
of days.
Figure 23: Cluster tree network with each cluster in a wireless mesh
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9.2 Discussion of Reliability
The ZigBee protocol like most other protocols features acknowledgments and
retransmissions in case a packet is lost. Before every transmission the source
device will check if a route to the destination device is present. In a CBM
scenario the end devices always sends messages to the network coordinator.
However in scenario A where the sensor only sends messages when the equipment
is in critical condition there is a need for some sort of mechanism to know that
the sensor is still operational. For example the network coordinator can ping
the end devices using a schedule. In scenario B where the sensors sends data
periodically we can easily know if the sensor is operational, the end program
that gathers information should have a function that alerts an user if data from
a certain device has not been received in a given amount of time.
ZigBee uses CSMA/CA to access the radio channel, this in theory can make
end devices wait before being able to send the data if the radio channel is busy.
This can cause a problem if the end devices cannot send the data when an
equipment is in a critical condition. This only applies to scenario A, because in
scenario B the sensor sends data in a schedule and can be coordinated by using
GTS. However this should not cause a signiﬁcant problem for scenario B either,
because it is highly unlikely that several equipment breaks down at the same
time and cause so much traﬃc that one sensor gets denied access to the radio
channel.
Our tests in an industrial environment shows that Wireless Sensor Networks,
here represented by the ZigBee protocol and XBee devices, can be reliable even
in the presence of some environmental obstacles that are common in industrial
environments. Our tests show that Magnetic ﬁelds have no signiﬁcant eﬀect
even very close to the source. Concrete walls do however pose a problem and
increases the need for routers to extend the range of the network. The use of
extra routers may increase the delay somewhat, but our tests show that the
extra delay is no more than 10ms for each extra hop packets need to travel
trough.
During our tests we discovered that encryption also cause more transmission
delay, around 10ms. Also when a transmission is encrypted using the network
key, every hop will decrypt and authenticate the packet and re-encrypt it, this
adds to the transmission delay.
As long as the signal level does not fall to low the delay should be within
50ms for one hop.
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9.3 Discussion of Security Requirements
ZigBee has an extensive set of security features, but does it fulﬁll the require-
ments of conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability requirements needed for a
CBM solution? The security requirements are diﬀerent depending on which
scenarios used in the CBM solution. For both conﬁdentiality and integrity Zig-
Bee and WirelessHART is very similar so we will only discuss the diﬀerences for
the availability requirement.
Conﬁdentiality
Conﬁdentiality is diﬀerent depending on the two scenarios. In Scenario A the
sensor decides the condition of the equipment, and only an alert is sent. The
alert can contain information about the equipment like why it was sent.
In Scenario B the sensor does not decide the condition of the equipment,
but is used for monitoring. The sensors sends data frequently with new updates
containing information about the equipment.
The frequency of data transmission in Scenario A makes it hard for an out-
sider to gather information about the equipment. The message only contains
an alert, additional information such as which machine, what monitor infor-
mation(temperature, vibration, etc)can be added as well. However there is no
need for the additional information. The equipment in critical condition can be
derived from the ID of the sensor, the monitor information can be decided by
having several alert levels. In the case of a furnace Level 1 can mean it starts to
overheat, Level 2 can mean its over the recommended level, Level 3 can be that
its in critical condition and needs maintenance right away and so on. All this
information can be in a central database of the company. This way an outsider
gains no real information even if he intercepts the message. No conﬁdentiality
protection is needed by using this method. However the central database needs
to be secure, but this issue is outside the scope of this thesis.
In Scenario B the messages sent from the sensor nodes contains information
about the equipment. Since the sensor sends more frequently and has more
information concerning the equipment, the company might want some sort of
conﬁdentiality protection. This can be accomplished by using encryption.
71
Integrity
Data integrity is equally important for both scenarios. Earlier we mentioned
three concept when it comes integrity: data integrity, system integrity and
authenticity.
Data integrity is vital in CBM. If there is no integrity check and outsider can
replay a message and cause unnecessary maintenance or send a remote command
to the sensor to send wrong information or not send information at all causing
equipment to break down. Data integrity is achieved by using Message Integrity
Code. A MIC is appended at the end of every frame containing a hash of the
message. The destination device then recalculate the hash when received and
compares it with the original hash. The packet is discarded if the hash doesn't
match. The sensor nodes will only accept commands coming from a trusted
source like the ZigBee coordinator or Trust Center, preserving data integrity.
To protect system integrity some sort of authorization method needs to be
implemented. The devices has no such method. If an outsider is able to gain
physical access to a ZigBee device he can easily reprogram the device. The only
way is to have good physical security and only allow trusted employees access
to the devices.
Authenticity of a message is achieved through entity authentication in high
security mode. Entity authentication is based on a challenge-response mecha-
nism based on a pre-shared secret. In this case a master or network key.
Both ZigBee and WirelessHART uses AES-128 in CCM mode. This allows
data to be conﬁdential and authenticated by devices with the correct keys.
Availability
The worse threat to availability in a Wireless Sensor Networks is jamming. Zig-
Bee uses DSSS for modulation. DSSS only uses one frequency and is therefore
more vulnerable to jamming compared to WirelessHART that uses FHSS. Zig-
Bee only scans frequency and channel during startup, so during jamming the
frequency and channel have to be manually set.
When an attacker compromises a node or is able to join a malicious node
in the network there are attacks that speciﬁcally targets availability of the net-
work. Such as routing loops and selective forwarding. These attacks increases
the latency and aﬀects the availability. As with integrity protection entity au-
thentication can be used to avoid these attacks.
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9.4 Securing the network
ZigBee features an extensive amount of security features that can be used to
secure the network. In this section we will discuss what features we recommend
for setting up a secure ZigBee network for use in an industrial environment.[6]
Note that not all vendors supports every security feature speciﬁed.
Protect the network using a Network Key ZigBee features three security
keys, the Master, Link and Network keys. While the use of master and link
keys are optional, the network should at least make use of the network key. The
network key is shared among all the nodes within the network and can be used
to all messages within the network. Nodes without a valid Network key cannot
join or send messages in the network.
Use address ﬁltering at the MAC layer If the ZigBee devices supports
this feature, it should be used so the ZigBee devices only accepts nodes from
authorized sources.
Employ encryption
As mentioned earlier, ZigBee provides data conﬁdentiality by utilizing AES-128
encryption. Encryption should be used to protect transmitted data.
Employ high security mode If possible use high security mode within the
network. High security mode mandates the use of key establishment using
SKKE protocol and entity authentication. High security mode permits the use
of Master, Link and Network keys, while Standard security mode only permits
the use of Link and Network keys.
Designate a ZigBee coordinator ZigBee supports wireless mesh networks
that is self-healing and self-organizing, one node however must function as the
coordinator and initiate formation of the network as well as perform other es-
sential functions as sending beacon transmissions and setting the security level
of the network. Any Full Function Device can be the coordinator, but from a
security perspective this ﬂexibility is not desirable.
It is recommended to set one designated node to be the coordinator and
disable all other FFD devices from being able to take over the role as coordi-
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nator. It is also a good idea to have a backup coordinator in case the primary
coordinator fails.
Pre-assign a PAN identiﬁer and restrict node connectivity It is espe-
cially important to pre-assign a node with PAN identiﬁer if the ZigBee network
is using a cluster tree network. The node is only permitted to join the cluster
with the same pre-assigned PAN identiﬁer.
Secure join procedures Some ZigBee units can acquire the key through a
physical connection. This is the optimal choice for getting the initial Master or
Network key. Only devices with the correct Master or Network is allowed to join
the network. This will result in no keys is sent over the air and secrecy of the
keys are protected at all times. If it is not possible to acquire the keys this way
the second alternative is send the initial key over the air, but using a diﬀerent
channel leading to a brief moment of vulnerability, but less risk compared to
using the primary channel. If possible pre-load the Trust Center address along
with the initial Master or Network Key.
Additionally the coordinator can turn oﬀ the option for new devices to join
the network. So even if an outsider knows the security keys they can't make a
malicious node join the network.
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10 Conclusion
One of the reasons Wireless Sensor Networks has yet to break through in the
industry is the security and reliability challenges in a wireless network. Some
companies cannot risk to have information leak out to outsiders and therefore
uses a wired connection instead of a wireless network. While wired connec-
tions are safer in many ways, wireless networks is more cost eﬀective. However
wired connections does not always work in all applications, one such applica-
tion is Condition Based Maintenance. The equipment or parts that needs to be
monitored can be moving or not easily accessed with a cable.
In a CBM solution the information sent over the air is not so sensitive that
loss of these information would lead to company losses. Depending on how the
sensors are used encryption of messages might not be necessary at all. However
based on our tests the transmission delay and power consumption in an en-
crypted message is not signiﬁcant higher so using encryption does not shorten
the life span of the battery signiﬁcantly and while it might not be necessary
to have encryption a company network should always be encrypted. Both Zig-
Bee and WirelessHART oﬀers encryption by using AES-128 in CCM mode, and
while you can use brute-force to gain access to the content of the message the
amount of time and contents might not be worth it.
More importantly than conﬁdentiality is integrity. While a loss of conﬁden-
tiality might not cause any company losses, a loss of integrity can cause losses
and unnecessary maintenance. ZigBee oﬀers integrity protection by using a Mes-
sage Integrity Code. The MIC can be set to 32, 64, or 128-bit. The bit-length
of the MIC determines the probability that a random guess of the MIC would
be correct.
Availability is major concern when it comes to Wireless Sensor Networks,
some method to detect when sensors are down needs to be implemented. Espe-
cially since ZigBee is more vulnerable to jamming compared to WirelessHART.
Based on our basic tests the sensor network seems to be reliable enough for
use in CBM. The end devices can last up to years depending on the frequency of
data transmissions on a battery. The delay and reliability mechanisms ensures
that messages get through, and the range of the ZigBee devices could cover a
relatively large area if there is no obstacles.
Wireless Sensor Networks seems to be able to fulﬁll the requirements needed
for a CBM solution, but before deploying a WSN some considerations should be
needed. Such as the basic security design. ZigBee has some unique challenges
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when it comes to security, and coordination between the end program and the
network is needed to be able to cover the weaknesses in ZigBee. Such as device
detection to ensure a node is up and running, or policies for allowing a new
device to join as most attacks revolves around compromising a node or be able
to let a malicious node join.
From what we have read about WirelessHART it does seem that it's more
robust than ZigBee with functions as FHSS and redundant paths. However
based on our tests we believe that ZigBee can deliver a reliable service in most
circumstances as long as there is procedures followed when the network might
be exposed for jamming.
As security in ZigBee networks is not mandatory, some research before pur-
chasing ZigBee units need to be done. To be able to maximize security in the
network make sure the ZigBee units is compatible with high security mode.
The technology in this thesis are in constant development, and in the near
future even stronger security or reliability will be implemented.
Further work
In this thesis we only had a network consisting of small number of nodes. A
larger scale network would provide more information and could be able to run
simulations of a CBM solution and tests the diﬀerent scenarios speciﬁed in this
thesis.
Experiments was only conducted on nodes using the ZigBee standard, and
while we theoretically compared it to WirelessHART we did not have any real
hands-on experience with WirelessHART. Tests using the WirelessHART stan-
dard would prove if our assumptions are correct.
According to the ZigBee speciﬁcation, the memory required for the Trust
Center grows with the number of devices in the network. This could lead to
limitations on the size of the network and would require a cluster tree network.
Test of memory requirements would be needed for a larger network.
Other areas of study is using public-private key encryption in embedded
devices. Using public key encryption in these kinds of networks would greatly
increase the security and privacy. Of special interest is TinyECC which is a
software package that provides Elliptic Curve Cryptology (ECC) based Public
Key Cryptology (PKC) for embedded devices like sensors in a wireless sensor
network. TinyECC provides a digital signature scheme, a key exchange protocol,
and a public key encryption scheme. Using TinyECC it is already possible to
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use PKC on many embedded devices with TinyECC, but it takes signiﬁcant
resources (CPU, Power consumption) to do[11].
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